The relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia have attained today a pick of tensions since their inception in the 90's and dialogue on European affairs is broadly 
Introduction
This paper aims at analysing the role and the impact of Portugal, as a member of the European Union (EU) since 1986, in the relationship with the biggest EU neighbour that is Russia. Since its integration, Portugal assumed three presidencies of the Council Their adoption came at a time when the relationship needed both new impetus and to adapt to systemic changes (enlargement and deepening of both the EU and the agenda of cooperation with Moscow). A major feature of the relationship has been the fact that economic objectives are enhanced, thus giving other areas a secondary priority.
Since 2007, the PCA has come to the end of its ten years validity. It has been extended each year since then, until a new agreement will be signed, as foreseen by article 106 of the PCA.
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The parties agreed to engage in the negotiation of a new cooperation treaty but several obstacles delayed the beginning of the talks, which started in July 2008. 3 Another component of the institutionalised framework of cooperation is the reference to common values and principles, replicated in all the documents produced in the context of the relation. For the EU, they are essential for a "genuine They are the following (and they apply to the European Neighbourhood Policy as well): the rule of law; good governance; the respect for human rights, including minority rights; the promotion of good neighbourly relations; the principles of market economy and sustainable development. simplification of the draft Constitutional Treaty), Portugal had also to resume objectives that were not achieved by the former German Presidency. Externally, the more sensitive and stagnating agenda was EU-Russia relations.
We aim, thus, at questioning the role of the Portuguese Presidency in developing a strategic relationship with Moscow, taking into consideration its priorities, namely the orientations of its foreign policy. Russia is the largest European neighbor without accession claims to the EU. Moscow is also an essential partner in dealing with regional and global security issues. The paper focuses on the period surrounding 2007 and builds significantly on primary sources and field research as it analyses both formal and unformal practices. Our qualitative research includes sources retrieved from official policy documents, secondary literature and semi-structured interviews with EU and Russian officials. Göteborg, 15 and 16 June, (SN 200/101VER 1 Eastern and Southern Neighbours COM (2003) 104 final, March 11. Brussels, 2003. 6 Additionally, the internal challenge of the revision of the EU treaties was still under difficult progress. 7 The author collaborated with the Embassy of Portugal in Moscow during the Portuguese presidency, in the second semester of 2007.
actors, and how their preferences are advanced in the relation with Russia, the paper do not aim at explaining the EU functioning as such.
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When appropriate, the role of the national level as compared to the community level will be addressed.
Firstly, we analyze how two orientations of Portuguese foreign policy determined its role towards Russia during the 2007 Presidency. Secondly, the paper addresses the tensions in EU-Russia relations that impacted on the scope of the Portuguese presidency. Finally, we assess the outcomes of the Presidency and what was (not) within its reach, given the institutional and political context in which it operated.
The Portuguese synthesis of two foreign policy objectives: Lusitanian and

European.
Prime Minister Sócrates said that "the current international situation requires the EU to assume special responsibilities. Europe should be a more active player on the international scene." The Portuguese priorities to achieve this goal are rooted in two core drivers of foreign policy: the Atlantic and the Lusitanian traditions. Ministros, No. 19/2013 . 5 April, 2013 treatment to be given to Russia (these elements are more specifically addressed in the second section of the paper).
The Prime Minister made a preparatory trip to Moscow in late May 2007 with two different objectives: enhance bilateral agreements and initiate a more direct dialogue with Putin, at a time when any contact was irritating between the parts. The second goal was highly symbolic in that it came in the wake of an EU-Russia summit in Samara, and in an environment drawn up by crises in the relationship (see below).
Sócrates conveyed openness to Putin, as his comment on the conversation he had with the Russian leader illustrates: "If we talked about democracy and human rights? Yes, but not to contaminate relations it is important that no one starts to give moral lessons to anyone." 11 These words provoked an immediate accusation of treason to the cause of human rights by the NGO "Human Rights Watch". 12 The ambassador in Moscow, Marcelo Curto, later confirmed the Portuguese attitude to Russia: the dialogue with
Moscow is inevitable, and should not contain too strong components of "Europeanisation". He said, publicly: "we will not lecture Russia." The trade balance between Portugal and Russia is highly deficient, although Sócrates stressed that Portuguese exports increased significantly in the previous four years. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is reduced, leaving Portugal in the 51st place among foreign investor in Russia, and Moscow in the 58th place in relation to Portugal. These elements and the economic health of Russia, at the time, explained that the Russian market was a priority of the Portuguese government and the fact that bilateral visits had been planned well in advance.
14 Another topic of the bilateral visit to Moscow was the energy realm. The theme was communicated more vaguely, although the possibility of Gazprom buying shares of Galp Energia, through Amorim Energia, was referred since 2006. This step is part of the grand strategy of Gazprom: to consolidate bilateral contracts with national companies of member states to strengthen its leadership in the supply of natural resources market. The purpose of these agreements is not only to extend the European dependence on Russian gas consumption and oil but also to allow Russian access to national trading markets.
The signing of a Russian protocol with API laid the ground for the construction of an ethylene plant in Sines. There was also a desalination project in the Algarve region.
Portugal is one of the few European countries without energy dependence on Russia.
The above-mentioned developments, although needing further information for the Gazprom-Galp case that did not materialize, would confirm the projection of Russian power. Gazprom is a leader in worldwide gas extraction, is a State monopoly and a quarter of its market lies in Europe.
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With the United States, tourists from Russia are the first non-EU tourists coming to member states. Although Spain has grown as a top destination for Russians in the EU, Portuguese growth potential is also noticeable. 
The inherited tensions
At the European and multilateral level, the relationship between Portugal and Russia is much more politically complex than at the bilateral level. In the framework of the EU Presidency, Lisbon had to deal with irritants that prevented a constructive relationship with Moscow. Among those were disagreements over the United States plan to install an anti-missile missile system in Europe, the final status of the Serbian province of Kosovo, the Russian embargo on Polish meat, the regulation of energy market and the evolution of the authoritarian Putin regime.
In 2007, the renewal of the PCA was at the core of the EU-Russia relationship because the treaty was due to expire at the end of that year. Automatic renewal of the agreement was expected on a yearly basis provided that neither party notifies the other otherwise. It would, however, need to negotiate a new treaty that reflects the evolution of the relationship since 1997, the year of entry into force of the PCA. For this, the EU Council should mandate the Commission to start the negotiation process. However, this mandate had not been approved yet due to the veto of Poland. Warsaw had a trade dispute with Moscow over a Russian ban on Polish meat, and placed the lifting of the embargo as a sine qua non condition to allow a new treaty. Although the issue emerged as a veterinary question, and therefore technical, there was a broader political rationale.
Since the Eastern enlargement, in May 2004, the presence of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has initiated a change in the EU's attitude towards Russia.
Two clusters of member states appeared: a more pro-Russian group and another more anti-Russian. This internal bipolarity reflects the fact that there is no consensus on the method to be adopted to deal with Russia, an increasingly difficult partner and rapidly evolving. The likelihood of achieving a strategic vision of the EU on what should be its relationship with Russia is, thus, very scarce. This tendency has been further confirmed by the worsening of tensions with the Kremlin, especially after the annexation of Crimea in early 2014. Although the High Representative of the EU, Frederica Mogherini, tried to push for a more unified stance, the member states strongly reacted to the attempt to give the EU a pivotal role. 
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The message that there will be "no business as usual" and, compliance to it, is a novelty from the EU side. Brussels, 27 June, 2007. 24 In March 2003, the European Commission created a new concept to be the basis of its new neighborhood policy, "Wider Europe -Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", which is part the aim of developing a neighborhood of prosperity and friendship. The strategic objective of creating security in their neighborhood was also stated by the EU in the "European Security Strategy" of December 2003. In January 2007, the EU completed the full restructuring of its financial instruments for that purpose, with the creation of a single new tool: the "European Neighbourhood Policy instrument" (ENPI). Russia is not a partner country of the European Neighbourhood Policy and shows little interest in having access to new financing (in which the former TACIS program, which was designed for Russia, was merged).
Russian fear of a domino effect, derived from the "color revolutions" (democratization and europeanization of Ukraine and Georgia, and European orientations of Moldova), takes the Kremlin to assert its sovereign prerogatives in its near abroad. The latter corresponds to the fourteen new independent states that forcibly integrated the former USSR. This zone of vital interest, or sphere of influence, is essential in the Russian perception of threats.
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Additionally, Moscow started to use its energy resources as a means of foreign policy in the sense that it raised prices and disrupted gas supplies, mainly since 2006.
Dependence of Europe on Russian gas corresponds in fact to interdependence, since Moscow still needs European markets (China is an uncertain alternative market). Estonia and Latvia had not adopted an isolation and blockade strategy. Latvia itself suffered from a Russian cut of oil supplies since 2002. A diplomat of the country stressed that the losses were more important than the Polish losses. However, about two weeks before the summit in Samara, Lithuania followed the Poles and also decided to veto the mandate based on the aggravation of its disputes with Moscow. According to a Lithuanian official, the veto was necessary to draw the attention of other member states to national difficulties. While recognizing that solidarity had increased within the EU, 31 COEST is the working party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. September 1, 2008 . SEC(2008 2786 . Brussels, November 5, 2008 It is out of the scope of this paper to explain how this issue progressed from a bilateral problem to an EU-Russia issue. 36 Interview with a member states representative, July 2007. he believed that the EU's adaptation to new interests, and consideration of national problems, is a lengthy process.
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It seemed that the deterioration of Russian-British relations, focusing on the Litvinenko murder investigation, the former KGB spy, may have raised to three the number of member states to follow that route but it was not the case.
In May 2007, Sócrates tried to be conciliatory with Putin in anticipation of the EU Presidency but Lisbon inherited the limits imposed by the deteriorated diplomatic dialogue and effective blockades in the agenda. Merkel and Barroso stances at the Samara summit delimitated the room for manoeuvre. At Samara, as above-mentioned, the Commission and the Presidency voiced the principle of solidarity among member states for the first time, giving thus a direct support to Poland, Estonia and Lithuania. 38 Putin also announced that he was ready for a reconciliation but not at any price.
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The two leaders had a three hours long meeting at closed doors. Sócrates could not help address the compelling issues: embargoes to Eastern Europe, energy and human rights in Russia. Portugal had an interest that was not driven by difficult historical memories and considered that the external Eastern border had to be preserved. It understood that the relation with Moscow is strategic in a realistic way as opposed to rhetoric stances. The fact that there are no simmering bilateral issues between Lisbon and Moscow allows for a "pure policy" towards Moscow. mandate to negotiate a new PCA, the identification of the difficulties in the relationship would be a satisfying output for the semester. The meeting of the first PPC on culture, on October, represented a novelty as it was the first concrete step to advance the relation in this area.
Conclusion
The road from the Samara summit, led by the German presidency, and the Mafra summit, organized by the Portuguese presidency, both in 2007, was long and uncertain, despite the few months that separated the events. The distance to go was essentially political. The EU-Russia dialogue appeared to be increasingly a dialogue of the deaf.
On the one hand, the EU wanted a more European Russia that would converge to its political values and economic rules. On the other hand, Russia wanted to be recognized as a partner on equal footing, and redefine the rules of the international game. Álvaro Mendonça e Moura, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the EU, stressed that the Presidency was a moving target and that the preparation of alternative scenarios was a necessity in order to adapt to circumstances.
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This global observation is particularly accurate for relations with Russia. Despite the disagreements and irritants, the existence of a dialogue was valuable for bridging the gap of mutual perceptions of the EU 27 and a more assertive Russia. Dialogue was also necessary given the economic and security interdependencies. Within the EU, there was no unified attitude to engage with Russia and its internal developments. Portugal was considered as being part of the "neutral" 
